1. Case Overview
a. Party Represented by Barun Law: The defendant, the Mayor of Incheon Metropolitan City.
b. Background of the Case
The plaintiff was the project operator implementing a housing site development project in the Nonhyeon (2) District of Incheon (the "Housing Site Development Project"). The defendant granted approval for the housing site development plan related to the project, attaching a condition (the "First Condition") that "the installation of 바카라 사이트 디시 ('Sorae IC') and the allocation of its costs shall be separately discussed with Incheon Metropolitan City before the approval of the implementation plan." Subsequently, the defendant imposed an additional condition (the "Second Condition") stating that "based on the results of the traffic impact assessment review, the plaintiff shall be responsible for installing 바카라 사이트 디시."
The plaintiff submitted a written undertaking to install 바카라 사이트 디시, upon which the defendant requested the plaintiff to resume the basic and detailed design work for the interchange and to submit a revised plan or supplementary materials (the "First Notice"). Later, the defendant again requested the plaintiff to resume the design work, warning that failure to comply with the implementation order could result in suspension of construction or the imposition of a fine (the "Second Notice").
c. Litigation Details
The plaintiff argued that under Article 35(1) and (4) and Attached Table 6(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Housing Construction Promotion Act, the obligation to install and bear the cost of 바카라 사이트 디시, as a "road as a main facility," rested with the local government, Incheon Metropolitan City. Accordingly, the First and Second Conditions unlawfully imposed such obligations on the plaintiff in violation of the above provisions and were therefore null and void as they contained material and manifest defects. The plaintiff further argued that the First and Second Notices, issued on the premise of those invalid conditions, were also unlawful as they lacked legitimate grounds for disposition. The lower court accepted the plaintiff's arguments in full.
In response, we, on behalf of the defendant, contended that the lower court erred in (i) its interpretation and application of the legal concept of "road as a main facility" under the former Housing Site Development Promotion Act and the former Housing Construction Promotion Act, and (ii) its determination of whether the administrative acts related to the First and Second Conditions contained material and manifest defects.
2. Court's Decision and Grounds
The Supreme Court held that, considering the provisions of the former Housing Site Development Promotion Act, the former Housing Construction Promotion Act, and their subordinate statutes as a whole, under Article 35(4) and Attached Table 6(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Housing Construction Promotion Act, which defines the scope of installation for "roads as main facilities" as "from the trunk road located outside the housing complex to the boundary of the complex, where the length exceeds 200 meters, limited to the excess portion", the obligation to install and bear the costs of such facilities lies with the local government only if the relevant road connects the "trunk road" outside the housing complex to the boundary of the housing complex. The Court further clarified that the term "trunk road" refers, under Article 2.7 of the former Housing Construction Standards Regulations, to a road that allows both pedestrian and vehicular passage.
Since 바카라 사이트 디시 connects the project site with the Seohaean Expressway, which is an expressway for vehicles only and not classified as a "trunk road," the Court held that 바카라 사이트 디시 did not constitute a road connecting a "trunk road" to the housing complex boundary. Therefore, Article 35(4) and Attached Table 6(1) of the former Enforcement Decree did not apply, and the defendant (Incheon Metropolitan City) was not obligated to install or bear the cost of the interchange. On these grounds, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision.
3. Our Argument and Role
We conducted an in-depth analysis of the former Housing Site Development Promotion Act, the former Housing Construction Promotion Act, and their subordinate statutes, emphasizing that:
- The term "road as a main facility" refers to a road that allows pedestrian passage.
- The local government's installation obligation arises only for the excess portion where the length of such a road exceeds 200 meters.
We further argued that since 바카라 사이트 디시 is a highway interchange through which pedestrian passage is impossible, it cannot be regarded as a "road as a main facility" under the statutes. Moreover, because the interchange was to be constructed within less than 200 meters from the boundary of the housing site development district, it did not fall within the category of a "road for which the local government bears an installation obligation." By persuasively advancing these arguments, we successfully secured a reversal and remand from the Supreme Court.
4. Significance of the Judgment
This decision is significant in that it clarified the scope of the public responsibilities of local governments concerning "roads as main facilities for which local governments bear an installation obligation" under the former Housing Site Development Promotion Act and related statutes.
